Absolutely no leeway for political solution
By: S. D. Keerthy
The political bankruptcy of the Sri Lankan state in solving the ethnic conflict never stood so well exposed. In the past the Sinhala polity was always able to convince everybody including many politically minded Tamil intellectuals that it was somehow possible ultimately to find a federal solution to the conflict.
Today the letters written by the LTTE outlining the reasons why it cannot accept the interim mechanisms proposed by Sri Lankan government have exposed the fact that the Sri Lankan consbreastution is so inflexible that even an transitional arrangement to stabilise the peace process is not possible under its provisions.
Earlier, in every instance of negotiating a political settlement with the Sri Lankan government Tamil leaders failed miserably in spite of their much-vaunted legal prowess to expose the utter bankruptcy of the Sinhala polity and the legal instruments which gave it the sole, inalienable right to legislate, administer and adjudicate the island's affairs and control its national wealth.
Instead they helped the Sri Lankan state, wittingly or unwittingly, to cultivate the impression that it was 'reasonable'.
It is now time for the Tamil polity to relentlessly expose the utter inflexibility of Sri Lanka's consbreastution and the unwillingness on the part of the Sinhala polity to operate beyond its irremediably constricting parameters.
The crux of the problem is that control over the country's national wealth is inalienably concentrated in the hands of the Sinhala majority despite the fact that Tamils contribute a fare share in creating the island's national wealth.
Similarly the right to legislate, administer and adjudicate too are confined to the Sinhala majority.Article 76.1 of the Consbreastution expressly prohibits the Parliament from devolving its legislative authority, including the right to handle the country's finances, to any other body. This provision vests on the Sinhala majority the sole right to control the finances and stipulates that the right is inalienable.
Giving further strength to 76.1, Articles 148-54 of the Consbreastution clearly prohibit any insbreastution other than Parliament or one authorised by it from getting involved directly in disbursing or handling public funds.
Article 154 of the Consbreastution and section 13 of the Finance Act No. 38 of 1971 describe the duties and functions of the Auditor-General. The Article imposes a duty on him to audit the accounts of all public insbreastutions including that of the Prime Minister's Office.In this context can the auditor general be answerable to Parliament if the proposed Apex body conducts its own auditing with his mere concurrence? No. It again raises the question of the proposed body's legality in another form.
Parliament by legislation (Finance Act), the Public Accounts Committee (established under the Standing Orders of Parliament) by its reports, and the Treasury by its minutes have laid down a long series of complicated rules (and practices as well) to secure Parliament's (i.e. the Sinhala majority's) sole control over the country's finances.In the final analysis, there is no way one can hope to circumvent this complex web of rules and practices in granting the right to a body to enable Colombo and the Liberation Tigers to jointly utilise and administer funds for the development and reconstruction of the northeast.
Under Sri Lanka's Finance Act, expenditure over a certain amount of public money requires the approval of the cabinet. The President of the Republic will chair the meetings of the cabinet.
Also, all the administrative mechanism proposed by Sri Lankan government as interim measures have to necessarily recognise the mandate of the External Resources Department as the principal and co- coordinating agency of the Sri Lankan government for foreign loans and grants. Provisions of the Consbreastution, particularly Appendix III of the 13th Amendment leave no room for any doubt on this matter.
In this context, the LTTE would be a partner in negotiating loans and grants from foreign governments and donor agencies to bring in the money into the country's coffers. But the partnership would end there. When it comes to spending the monies brought in thus, the LTTE cannot have a say because the involvement of the cabinet in this matter is inevitable in accordance with statutory requirements. As far as the loans and grants are concerned, only the Dept. of external resources can enter into contractual obligations on behalf of the government. While the LTTE would also be negotiating for loans and grants as an equal partner in the proposed body, the signing of the contracts would be the business of the Sri Lankan government alone.
Neither North East Development and Reconstruction Council (NE DRC) that was proposed by Colombo as an expanded version of Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIRHN) nor the Apex body is legally viable under the provisions of the consbreastution for the same reasons for which the earlier Joint Task Force concept was abandoned.
An Interim administrative mechanism similar to the one proposed under the Indo Lanka Agreement can be set up by the President alone; and only while Emergency Regulations are in force.
But even such a body cannot jointly administer and utilise funds to rebuild the northeast, as it would be in contravention of the provisions of 13th amendment to Sri Lanka's consbreastution.
As a way out of the patent consbreastutional impbutte, the leader of the Liberation Tigers suggested an "interim administrative mechanism which could supersede the multiplicity of existing structures, which work at cross-purposes and impede the efficient utilisation of development funds" to be set up along the lines of the one envisaged under the Indo Lanka Agreement of 1987.
Under Sri Lanka's consbreastution there is no provision or legal loophole whereby an effective interim administrative body can be established and be made operable. Colombo has pointed to this fact when Tamil parties made a demand for such a body in 1994 and 1996.
However, in a set of proposals made jointly by the Indian and Sri Lankan Governments prior to signing of the Indo Lanka Agreement (known as the Bangalore Proposals) provision was made (under paragraphs 10.1 and 10.2) for the President to devolve his-her executive power on an interim administration for the interim period with a view to making it an effective mechanism responsible for development and reconstruction of the northeast.
The matter was taken up under the Indo Lanka Accord too, providing for a dominant role for the Liberation Tigers in the proposed interim administration. The insbreastution did not materialise and hence face the litmus test of it legality and operability as Colombo dragged its feet and as events on the military front precipitated war between the Indian army and the Liberation Tigers.
According to the provisions of Sri Lanka's consbreastution the President can devolve her-his executive power to an authority or body set up by her-him only under Emergency Regulations.
The Emergency, which has to be approved by Parliament every month, lapsed in late 2001 when President Chandrika Kumaratunga's People Alliance lost it majority after its chief coalition partner, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress crossed over to the opposition.Firstly, given the current, irreparably tattered state of cohabitation between President and Prime Minister one cannot even remotely contemplate any devolution of executive power to an interim administrative mechanism for the northeast. Secondly, the Emergency is not in force now and no right thinking person would endorse the re-imposition of its draconian regulations.
Thirdly and most importantly, Appendix III to the 13th Amendment very clearly stipulates that all matters connected with Public Debt, Foreign loans, government funds, the Central Bank, Audit of the accounts of the GOSL and of the Provinces fall within the purview of the Central government. Therefore an interim body as envisaged under the Indo Lanka Agreement cannot ever be a viable mechanism for jointly utilising and administering funds for the development and reconstruction of the northeast.The SIRHN and the Joint Task Force, which was proposed by earlier as a mechanism for the joint utilisation and administration of funds, were held legally invalid and hence inoperable along the lines envisaged at the peace negotiations for the same consbreastutional reasons.
In these circumstances, the North East Development and Reconstruction Council (NE DRC) and the Apex body concept as envisaged in the drafts sent by the Sri Lankan government to the LTTE have to necessarily end up as another farce in the repertoire of Sinhala legal experts.
The proposed NE DRC and the Apex body, shorn of the legalese frills are sham - nothing but a version of the Joint Task Force with deceptive window dressings.The draft sent by Colombo to the LTTE on 17 May offered an expanded mechanism of SIHRN transforming it into three-layered structure consisting of a policy board, project committee and an administrative body, deriving its sole authority from the Prime Minister's office. The system with the Apex body sent later was a further expanded version of this.
The proposed policy board under the Apex body has to be consbreastuted as a statutory board by an act of parliament.
But Article 44 of the Consbreastution very clearly states that the functions of such bodies shall be buttigned by the President and that she has the power to take over these functions with or without consulting the Prime Minister. The fate that befell the National Lotteries Board makes this amply clear.
But above all many legal experts have overlooked the important fact that an administrative mechanism set up specially to handle reconstruction and development of the northeast would be held illegal by the Supreme Court because the province is under a Governor's rule. The Governor is answerable to the President. Negating or undermining his authority by setting up a separate administrative mechanism for the province would tantamount to eroding the President's executive power, which the Supreme Court held as inalienable in its judgement rejecting the 19th Amendment to the Consbreastution brought by Prime Minister Ranil Wicremesinghe's government. Also other provinces might object to such a mechanism.
Ultimately nothing, even a flimsy transitional administrative arrangement to consolidate the peace process in the northeast is possible within the legal foundation on which the Sinhala polity has firmly placed itself.
It is time for the Sinhala polity to come clean of its consbreastutional intransigence.
-
Is this terrorism or democracy?
Saththurukondan Mbuttacres: 180 Tamils butchered - Sep 10, 1990
Saththurukondan Mbuttacres: 180 Tamils butchered On 10 September 1990, over 180 Tamil civilians were butchered by the Sri Lanka army at the Saththurukondan Army Camp in the Batticaloa District. At an inquiry into the mbuttacre, the Officer-in-Charge of the camp, Captain.Gamini Varnakula Sooriya said "On that day no search or arrest was conducted by us". He also reiterated that none of his men even ventured out of the camp on the day of the mbuttacre. The sole survivor of the mbuttacre, Kanthasamy Krishnakumar aged 27, however recounted the chilling facts
--
Continues.
like
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
LTTE should demand that the Sri Lankan government:
To STOP the war in the north and east of Sri Lanka to initiate a peace
To REMOVE the war chorusing racists political leaders from the government positions
To SACK all armed forces commanders advocating the war from their post.
To LIFT the economic embargo imposed on the Tamil people immediately.
To ALLOW the displaced Tamil people to resettle in their own homeland
To PROVIDE rehabilitation support for the Tamils to rebuild their lives
--
" - 'The Sinhala political organizations and their leadership, which are deeply buried in the mud of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism, will never be able to comprehend the political aspirations of the people of Tamil Eelam. None of the major Sinhala political parties are prepared to recognize the fundamentals underlying the Tamil national question. None of the Sinhala political organizations is prepared to accept the northeastern region as the historical homeland of the Tamil-speaking people, that the Tamils consbreastute themselves as a distinct nationality and that they are enbreastled to the right to self-determination, including the right to secede. -
======================================================
Sri Lankan War Crime :
Sinhala person War Crime:
================================================= LTTE is a politico- military organisation, which is fighting for the right of self-determination of the Tamil people =================================================
