* Saddam Hussein refuses to sell out Iraq * Blair planned Iraq war from start * The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights Report on Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in the EU - Developments since September 11 * EXTREME BIRTH DEFORMITIES * Pictures: Armored humvee hit by roadside plant and abrams tank traped in the mud www.abolkhaseb.net-images-mortar-attack-us-humvee-260405.htm * Dokumentation: "Operation Iraqi Freedom" in Bildern * Torture Inc. Americas Brutal Prisons * A message from the IRAQI RESISTANCE to the people of the world and the US-UK soldiers in Iraq www.giv-seiten.info-www.giv-archiv.de-Report-Videos-message-from-resistance.wmv * Mujahideen Army in Iraq: Message To the people of America www.giv-seiten.info-www.giv-archiv.de-Report-Videos-Bayan-7.wmv * Internationale Irakkonferenz - Berlin, 12.Mrz 2005 Scheich Hadi Al Khalisi - Irakischer Nationaler Grndungskongress Awni Al Kalemji - Irakische Patriotische Allianz
Saddam Hussein refuses to sell out Iraq
Egyptian Magazine publishes transcript of meeting in prison between Saddam Hussein and Donald Rumsfeld.
Translated by Muhammad Abu Nasr
The Egyptian magazine al-Usbu` on Monday, 2 May 2005, published what it said was the text of a conversation between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on his latest trip to Baghdad during which he visited the imprisoned Iraqi leader. Al-Usbu` reports that informed political sources had disclosed the details of the meeting.
Al-Usbu` reports that the meeting took place after an escalation of Iraqi Resistance attacks against US occupation forces and their allies and stooges in Iraq. The sources indicated that the US had lost more than 1,600 men end and wounded in the last three months, only a fraction of which they officially admitted. The available information indicates that US President George W. Bush held a meeting with his staff in which they discussed ways to stop the Resistance violence in Iraq. In order to save us lives and stop the continued deterioration of relations between the US and its allies and other countries that sent forces to occupied Iraq. The US leadership arrived at a decision to offer to release the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and take him to his preferred place of exile outside Iraq in return for his appearing on television to demand that the Iraqi Resistance halt its armed operations and form a political party to take part in the political process set up by the US occupation forces in Iraq.
Bush entrusted his Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, with the task of going to Iraq immediately to urge the quick formation of a new Iraqi puppet "government" and to meet with the Iraqi "leaders" who have emerged from the 30 January "election" results held under the threat of US weapons in occupied Iraq. At the same time, however, Rumsfeld was to meet with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in his American prison near Saddam International Airport west of Baghdad.
The Saddam Hussein-Rumsfeld meeting reportedly lasted nearly an hour and took place in the presence of the commander of US occupation forces in Iraq. Rumsfeld followed up on his meeting by sending a report to President Bush in which he enclosed minutes of his meeting with the Iraqi President and offered outlines for how the US should deal with future developments in Iraq. He is said to have stressed the need for pursuing various ways to hold political dialogue with the Resistance and with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
In his report, al-Usbu` said, Rumsfeld emphasized that the situation in Iraq was increasingly dangerous. He said that the Arab Resistance looked like an organized army in the making and that it was training well and had been provided with important support in weapons and other material back up. Rumsfeld said that the number of Resistance fighters in Iraq had now reached 400,000 active fighters and that around them were more than five million people providing the Resistance with support.
Rumsfeld said that what took place in al-Fallujah had a negative impact on the security situation and that the Resistnace had succeeded in reaping the fruits of the "war on terror" being waged by the united states to use them for its benefit. He said that Iraqi youths were now vying with one another in volunteering to fight in the ranks of the Resistance.
Rumsfeld confirmed that the names of many of the Resistance organizations that declare themselves here and there are nothing but fronts for organizations of the Arab Baath Party under the leadership currently of Izzat Ibrahim ad-Duri, the Vice President of Iraq.
Rumsfeld expressed the expectation that the situation would become much more difficult in the coming period since the pace of armed operations against the US forces had greatly accelerated, and now stands at more than 200 attacks every day, making dozens of casualties in the "coalition"and puppet "national guard" ranks likely.
Rumsfeld said that he had reviewed numerous American and Iraqi reports that reveal a deterioration in the security situation in Iraq and a fall in the morale level of the troops as casualties and material losses increase.
Rumsfeld indicated that there have also been serious material losses in US ranks, and that the Americans are now loosing an average of at least 30 military vehicles every week, something that is continually depleting American power.
Rumsfeld also disclosed that the Resistance had just recently seized stockpiles of advanced American weaponry including artillery and rocket launchers as well as anti-aircraft launchers and that the US command expressed the fear that these arms would soon have their effect in escalating the movements of violence and Resistance operations.
At the end of his report, al-Usbu` reports, Rumsfeld urged the continuation of the dialogue with Saddam Hussein and his supporters until they can arrive at a formula for bringing about a temporary truce to facilitate a discussion of both sides' proposals.
Al-Usbu` obtained the minutes of the conversation between Saddam Hussein and Donald Rumsfeld from a reliable American source. The following are the minutes of the meeting:
Minutes of the meeting between President Saddam Hussein and US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
At the beginning of the meeting President Saddam appeared extremely calm, perhaps he was surprised that his visitor was Rumsfeld, but he did not show any nervous tension. Rumsfeld began the discussion:
Rumsfeld: I have come to meet you to talk with out about the situation in Iraq. We have been in communication with some of your supporters inside and outside Iraq and they advised us to listen to you.
Saddam Hussein: And what is it that you want? Your forces have occupied the territory of noble Iraq; you brought down the ruling regime without any legal basis; you attacked the sovereignty of an independent, free, sovereign country; and you committed crimes that history will record as testimony against your bloodstained civilization. So what more do you want after all that?
Rumsfeld (trying to conceal his anger): there no call for going into the past. I've come specially to present you a clear and specific offer and I want to hear from you a clear and specific answer.
Saddam Hussein (mockingly): I suppose you've come to apologize and return authority to the Iraqis.
Rumsfeld: We have nothing to apologize for. You were a danger to your neighbors. You were trying to acquire weapons of mbutt destruction, and you practiced dictatorship over your people. So it was natural for us to extend our hands to help the people of Iraq to rid themselves of the perils they faced for more than thirty years.
Saddam Hussein: I know that you're ignorant of history and I know that your president is no less ignorant. But it seems that you've been telling lies for so long that you have come to believe them yourselves. If you mean by "our neighbors" the Zionist Enbreasty, then, yes, we really were posing a danger to it and preparing to liberate our plundered land in Palestine. This is the trust of every Arab person, not just Iraqis, for that land is Arab and its people are Arab and the Zionists have done nothing but occupy the land. They came to us from every corner of the world with your help and that of the old colonial powers. But if you mean Kuwait, I would like to ask you: Have you withdrawn from Kuwait or not?
Rumsfeld: These are security issues. Besides, between us and Kuwait and the other Gulf States there are security agreements. We came in based on their request to defend them from your threats.
Saddam Hussein: Isn't it funny to entrust the wolf to guard the sheep? The Kuwaiti people are an Arab people, and Kuwait is Iraqi territory. So I would ask you to go and read up on history well, except that I am sure that you will never be able to grasp it.
Rumsfeld: Enough of this chatter. I am offering you . . .
Saddam Hussein (cuts him off): Before you offer me your rotten goods, I want to ask you: did you find any weapons of mbutt destruction or not?
Rumsfeld (confused): we haven't found any so far. But we definitely will find them one day. Do you deny that you had the intention of making a nuclear plant?
Saddam Hussein: We had no weapons of mbutt destruction since 1991. We were truthful when we spoke to the International Inspection Team and we were truthful in our letters to Kofi Annan. And you knew those facts, but you were looking for any false excuse to occupy Iraq and overthrow the legal authorities.
Rumsfeld: The Iraqis greeted us happily and welcomed us and the reason was the bloody practices of your regime for all the years in which you ruled Iraq.
Saddam Hussein: I ask you, Mr. Rumsfeld . . . Enough lying. You are the ones who opened up cascades of blood on the land of Iraq. You plotted against us and you came with some traitors to take over rule of the great land of Iraq.
Rumsfeld: The ones you call traitors were chosen as their leaders by the Iraqi people by democratic means and clean elections, such as never took place while you ruled the country.
Saddam Hussein: I knew that you came with a band of traitors with Jalal at-Talibani in their front ranks (laughs mockingly). Great Iraq being ruled by at-Talibani and al-Ja`fari, isn't that ridiculous? And what kind of elections are you talking about. Is it possible to hold free elections, as you call them, when our country is occupied? Mr. Rumsfeld, we have learned from history that occupiers come only with their lackeys and agents, then you want after all that to convince me that the people of Iraq are enjoying freedom and democracy? You must really be delirious.
Rumsfeld (trying very hard to control his anger): You are in isolation and don't know the facts of what is going on outside. The Iraqi people have been freed from your oppression. If they saw you or any of you men in the street, they would destroy you!!
Saddam Hussein: And I bet you that if you were able to announce where you are in Iraq, if the Iraqi Resistance learned where you were, you wouldn't be able to get out alive. I want to pbutt on some advice that you must convey to your stupid president: you must tell him to save what remains of his troops. rest is stalking them in every place and history will not forgive him.
Rumsfeld: I came to talk with you about the 'person' operations that your men are inciting and carrying out. Your men recently carried out a foul attack against Abu Ghurayb prison where more than 50 Americans were end or wounded, and they end a number of those in custody on various charges as well. Your men are getting help from persons from every corner of the world and they are threatening the democratic experiment in Iraq.
Saddam Hussein: What exactly is it that you want?
Rumsfeld: I'm making you one offer and that is that you will be released and can chose for yourself a place of exile freely, in any country you like, on condition that you go on television and issue a condemnation of terrorism and order your men to stop these acts.
Saddam Hussein: Have you obtained the agreement of your president to this offer?
Rumsfeld: Yes, this offer has been agreed on in a meeting in which the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Chief of Intelligence took part. And I have been authorized to inform you of this offer.
Saddam Hussein: It's a trifling offer.
Rumsfeld (with a sigh): We're also ready to bring elements close to you into the government.
Saddam Hussein: And what else?
Rumsfeld: You will be given generous financial buttistance and security protection for you and your family in the country of your choice.
Saddam Hussein: Do you want to hear my conditions?
Rumsfeld: I would love to.
Saddam Hussein (with an air of superciliousness and superiority) I want first from you that you set a time table for your withdrawal from Iraq and that your government commit itself to it before the world and that you begin the withdrawal immediately.
Secondly, I ask you to release immediately all the Iraqi and Arab prisoners in the prisons you have set up or in which you have taken the freedom of tens of thousands of honorable people of Iraq.
Thirdly, I ask from you to pledge to grant full compensation for the material losses that afflicted the Iraqi people as a result of your aggression against our country since the Mother of Battles in 1991 and until today. And I accept the buttistance of an Arab and International Committee in estimating the extent of those losses.
Fourth, I ask that you return the money that you and your men plundered from the treasuries of Iraq, and its oil, in particular that criminal L. Paul Bremer and his gang of traitors and renegades.
Fifth, the return of the artifacts that you stole and gave to the archaeological artifact mafia. These are treasures that are beyond all the monetary value in the world, because they carry the history of Iraq and its civilization. It's true that you don't have any civilization or history and that the lifespan of your country is no more than a few hundred years, but all that must not serve to justify your theft and your hatred for the civilization of Iraq and the wealth of Iraq.
And sixth, you must hand over the weapons of mbutt destruction if you have found any and return to us the lives of all the martyrs whose lives you took and to return the honor of the noble women of Iraq whom you dishonored.
Rumsfeld: Is this some kind of joke?
Saddam Hussein: No! This is the bitter reality. . . which you know, Mr. Rumsfeld. You have committed the greatest crime in history against a peaceful Arab country. We met together in the 1980s. Do you remember your offers?
Rumsfeld: Enough of the past. We are rebuttessing our positions towards you and towards a number of powers that have been hostile to us in the past. We have decided to hold dialogue with moderate Islamicists and we have no objection to their coming to power through the ballot box. More important than that we have decided to open channels for dialogue with 'person' organizations like Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and Hizb Allah, which is pro-Iranian, and also with other fundamentalist organizations in the whole world. We even have a plan for contacting the Taliban movement in Afghanistan to study the possibility of their participation in power, in exchange for their giving up arms.
Saddam Hussein: So you have begun to rethink your erroneous course?
Rumsfeld: It is a natural development of events. We are striving to spread democracy in all countries and movements subject to tyranny.
Saddam Hussein: May you prosper if you are truthful. I know your real aim, though. If you were really truthful, then you and your allies must begin immediately by withdrawing from Iraq. And you would also have to depart from your position of support for 'Israel'. But I know that your president is stubborn and arrogant and is not telling the truth.
Rumsfeld: He is a democratically elected president, not a bloody ruler like you.
Saddam Hussein: Terror is your product and lying is your method.
Rumsfeld: This offer is a historic opportunity for you. You will be released and we will consult with you in everything related to the running of Iraq. If you refuse this offer, the opportunity will not be fulfilled.
Saddam Hussein: I am not looking for opportunities. I am not looking for a way to save my neck from the gallows that you have set up for all of Iraq. If I wanted that I would have accepted the Russian offer and saved my sons and grandson from martyrdom. I don't know what has become of my family and my daughters and grandchildren. But believe me I am concerned with every Iraqi citizen and the future of great Iraq more than I am concerned with myself and my family.
Through your men, you previously made an offer that if I declare that weapons of mbutt destruction were smuggled to Syria, you said that in return you would release me. I rejected that then and I reject it again now.
Rumsfeld: I don't want a rejection from you. I want you to think about it. We are continuing our rebuttessment of our stances at the present time. We want to stop the bloodshed on both sides. And therefore we have made this offer out of the logic of power and not the logic of weakness.
We asked Jalal at-Talibani to make a statement denying any intention of executing you as a sign of good intentions on our part. We are ready to rebuttess our whole position on the political arrangement in Iraq as a whole and to discuss this matter with you and with your men.
Saddam Hussein: Are you ready to withdraw or not?
Rumsfeld: We can possibly discuss redeployment. Our forces have prepared bases for a long stay. We can possibly withdraw from streets and cities, but we will remain in the bases for some time.
Saddam Hussein: then you want a new stooge to add to that line of stooges. No Mr. Rumsfeld. Don't forget that you are talking with Saddam Hussein the President of the Republic of Iraq.
Math QuizW. K. Mahler www.worldmediahost.com Right !! Having a pee, probly. I cant remember, I was too drunk. Not me...
Rumsfeld: But you lost power.
Saddam Hussein: I have nothing left but honor and honor cannot be bought and sold.
Rumsfeld: But life is priceless.
Saddam Hussein: There is no value to life without honor. You robbed Iraq of its honor when you trampled on its land and we will regain our honor whether Saddam Hussein remains or dies a martyr.
Rumsfeld: Your supporters with whom we have been discussing told us that you were the first and last decision maker Were they expecting this reaction from you?
Saddam Hussein: Definitely, they know that Saddam Hussein cannot back away at the expense of his homeland and honor.
Rumsfeld: History will hold you responsible for the blood that is being shed in Iraq.
Saddam Hussein: Rather history will judge you for your crimes. I warned you before, saying that you would commit dissolution on the walls of Baghdad. And here you are paying the price. I want you to go to London and read the records of the British Foreign Office and learn something about the struggle of the Iraqi people against your British friends who are now repeating their mistakes and fighting with you. The Iraqi people are a stubborn people who do not fear rest. The Resistance is stronger than you imagine. So I promise you that you will have even more.
Sources:
www.albasrah.net www.albasrah.net-maqalatmukhtara-arabic-0505-sadamlqa020505.htm
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Blair planned Iraq war from start
Michael Smith
::nobreak::INSIDE Downing Street Tony Blair had gathered some of his senior ministers and advisers for a pivotal meeting in the build-up to the Iraq war. It was 9am on July 23, 2002, eight months before the invasion began and long before the public was told war was inevitable.
The discussion that morning was highly confidential. As minutes of the proceedings, headed "Secret and strictly personal - UK eyes only", state: "This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents."
In the room were the prime minister, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, and military and intelligence chiefs. Also listed on the minutes are Alastair Campbell, then Blair's director of strategy, Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, and Sally Morgan, director of government relations.
What they were about to discuss would dominate the political agenda for years to come and indelibly stain Blair's reputation; and last week the issue exploded again on the political scene as Blair campaigned in the hope of winning a third term as prime minister.
For the secret documents - seen by The Sunday Times - reveal that on that Tuesday in 2002:
Blair was right from the outset committed to supporting US plans for "regime change" in Iraq.
War was already "seen as inevitable".
The attorney-general was already warning of grave doubts about its legality.
Straw even said the case for war was "thin". So Blair and his inner circle set about devising a plan to justify invasion.
"If the political context were right," said Blair, "people would support regime change." Straightforward regime change, though, was illegal. They needed another reason.
By the end of the meeting, a possible path to invasion was agreed and it was noted that Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, chief of the defence staff, "would send the prime minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week".
Outside Downing Street, the rest of Britain, including most cabinet ministers, knew nothing of this. True, tensions were running high, and fears of terrorism were widespread. But Blair's constant refrain was that "no decisions" had been taken about what to do with Iraq.
The following day in the House of Commons, Blair told MPs: "We have not got to the stage of military action . . . we have not yet reached the point of decision."
It was typical lawyer's cleverness, if not dissembling: while no actual order had been given to invade, Blair already knew Saddam Hussein was going to be removed, sooner or later. Plans were in motion. The justification would come later.
AS a civil service briefing paper specifically prepared for the July meeting reveals, Blair had made his fundamental decision on Saddam when he met President George W Bush in Crawford, Texas, in April 2002.
"When the prime minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April," states the paper, "he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change."
Blair set certain conditions: that efforts were first made to try to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mbutt destruction (WMD) through weapons inspectors and to form a coalition and "shape" public opinion. But the bottom line was that he was signed up to ousting Saddam by force if other methods failed. The Americans just wanted to get rid of the brutal dictator, whether or not he posed an immediate threat.
This presented a problem because, as the secret briefing paper made clear, there were no clear legal grounds for war.
"US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community," says the briefing paper. "Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law."
To compound matters, the US was not a party to the International Criminal Court, while Britain was. The ICC, which came into force on 1 July, 2002, was set up to try international offences such as war crimes.
Military plans were forging ahead in America but the British, despite Blair's commitment, played down talk of war.
In April, Straw told MPs that no decisions about military action "are likely to be made for some time".
That month Blair said in the Commons: "We will ensure the house is properly consulted." On July 17 he told MPs: "As I say constantly, no decisions have yet been taken."
Six days later in Downing Street the man who opened the secret discussion of Blair's war meeting was John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee. A former MI6 officer, Scarlett had become a key member of Blair's "sofa cabinet". He came straight to the point - "Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by mbuttive military action".
Saddam was expecting an attack, said Scarlett, but was not convinced it would be "immediate or overwhelming".
His buttessment reveals that the primary impetus to action over Iraq was not the threat posed by weapons of mbutt destruction - as Blair later told the country - but the desire to overthrow Saddam. There was little talk of WMD at all.
The next contributor to the meeting, according to the minutes, was "C", as the chief of MI6 is traditionally known.
Sir Richard Dearlove added nothing to what Scarlett had said about Iraq: his intelligence concerned his recent visit to Washington where he had held talks with George Tenet, director of the CIA.
"Military action was now seen as inevitable," said Dearlove. "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD."
The Americans had been trying to link Saddam to the 9-11 attacks; but the British knew the evidence was flimsy or non-existent. Dearlove warned the meeting that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy".
It was clear from Dearlove's brief visit that the US administration's atbreastude would compound the legal difficulties for Britain. The US had no patience with the United Nations and little inclination to ensure an invasion was backed by the security council, he said.
Nor did the Americans seem very interested in what might happen in the aftermath of military action. Yet, as Boyce then reported, events were already moving swiftly.
"CDS (chief of the defence staff) said that military planners would brief (Donald) Rumsfeld (US defence secretary) on 3 August and Bush on 4 August."
The US invasion plans centred around two options. One was a full-blown reprise of the 1991 Gulf war, a steady and obvious build-up of troops over several months, followed by a large-scale invasion.
The other was a "running start". Seizing on an Iraqi casus belli, US and RAF patrols over the southern no-fly zone would knock out the Iraqi air defences. Allied special forces would then carry out a series of small-scale operations in tandem with the Iraqi opposition, with more forces joining the battle as they arrived, eventually toppling Saddam's regime.
The "running start" was, said Boyce, "a hazardous option".
In either case the US saw three options for British involvement. The first allowed the use of the bases in Diego Garcia and Cyprus and three squadrons of special forces; the second added RAF aircraft and Royal Navy ships; the third threw in 40,000 ground troops "perhaps with a discrete role in northern Iraq entering from Turkey".
At the least the US saw the use of British bases as "critical", which posed immediate legal problems. And Hoon said the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime.
AMID all this talk of military might and invasion plans, one awkward voice spoke up. Straw warned that, though Bush had made up his mind on military action, the case for it was "thin". He was not thinking in purely legal terms.
A few weeks later the government would paint Saddam as an imminent threat to the Middle East and the world. But that morning in private Straw said: "Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."
It was a key point. If Saddam was not an immediate threat, could war be justified legally? The attorney-general made his position clear, telling the meeting that "the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action".
Right from the outset, the minutes reveal, the government's legal adviser had grave doubts about Blair's plans; he would only finally conclude unequivocally that war was legal three days before the invasion, by which time tens of thousands of troops were already on the borders of Iraq.
There were three possible legal bases for military action, said Goldsmith. Self-defence, intervention to end an humanitarian crisis and a resolution from the UN Security Council.
Neither of the first two options was a possibility with Iraq; it had to be a UN resolution. But relying, as some hoped they could, on an existing UN resolution, would be "difficult".
Despite voicing concerns, Straw was not standing in the way of war. It was he who suggested a solution: they should force Saddam into a corner where he would give them a clear reason for war.
"We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors," he said.
If he refused, or the weapons inspectors found WMD, there would be good cause for war. "This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force," said Straw.
From the minutes, it seems as if Blair seized on the idea as a way of reconciling the US drive towards invasion and Britain's need for a legal excuse.
"The prime minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors," record the minutes. "Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD . . . If the political context were right, people would support regime change."
Blair would subsequently portray the key issue to parliament and the people as the threat of WMD; and weeks later he would produce the now notorious "loveed up" dossier detailing Iraq's suspected nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes.
But in the meeting Blair said: "The two key issues are whether the military plan works and whether we have the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work."
Hoon said that if the prime minister wanted to send in the troops, he would have to decide early. The defence chiefs were pressing to be allowed to buy large amounts of equipment as "urgent operational requirements". They had been prevented from preparing for war, partly by Blair's insistence that there could be no publicly visible preparations that might inflame splits in his party, partly by the fact there was no authorisation to spend any money.
The meeting concluded that they should plan for the UK taking part in any military action. Boyce would send Blair full details; Blair would come back with a decision about money; and Straw would send Blair the background on the UN inspectors and "discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam".
The final note of the minutes, says: "We must not ignore the legal issues: the attorney-general would consider legal advice with (Foreign Office-Ministry of Defence) legal advisers."
It was a prophetic warning.
Also seen by The Sunday Times is the Foreign Office opinion on the possible legal bases for war. Marked "Confidential", it runs to eight pages and casts doubt on the possibility of reviving the authority to use force from earlier UN resolutions. "Reliance on it now would be unlikely to receive any support," it says.
Foreign Office lawyers were consistently doubtful of the legality of war and one deputy legal director, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ultimately resigned because she believed the conflict was a "crime of aggression".
The Foreign Office briefing on the legal aspects was made available for the Downing Street meeting on July 23. Ten days ago, when Blair was interviewed by the BBC's Jeremy Paxman, the prime minister was asked repeatedly whether he had seen that advice.
"No," said Blair. "I had the attorney-general's advice to guide me."
But as the July 23 documents show, the attorney-general's view was, until the last minute, also riven with doubts.
Three years on, it and the questionable legality of the war are still hanging round Blair's neck like an albatross.
May 01, 2005
Copyright 2005 Times Newspapers Ltd.
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The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights Report on Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in the EU - Developments since September 11
Auszge aus dem Kapitel ber Deutschland
Germany ....
-------------------------------------------------- Negative Sentiments and Harbuttment against Muslims --------------------------------------------------
Atbreastudes toward Muslims have reportedly deteriorated in recent years. According to a survey conducted in late 2003, negative stereotypes against Muslims are on the rise among all groups of society.
Forty-six percent of all those interviewed in the survey fully or partly agreed with the statement that "Islam is a backward religion," 34% with the statement that "I am distrustful of people of Islamic religion," and 27% with the statement that "immigration to Germany should be forbidden for Muslims."340 Another survey carried out by the Allensbach polling agency in September 2004 indicated that 93% of Germans buttociate the word "Islam" with "oppression of women" and 83% with "terrorism." Only 6% of those surveyed said that they think of Islam as being "tolerant."
In the aftermath of September 11, Muslims have become increasingly vulnerable to harbuttment. During the first few months following the attacks on the United States, a series of cases involving verbal abuse, rest threats and violent attacks against Muslims and Muslim insbreastutions were reported.
Muslim women wearing the headscarf and Muslim men with turbans and long beards were reportedly particularly often the victims of harbuttment. Muslim organizations also observed an increase in anti-Muslim sentiments after the Madrid plantings in March 2004.
Following the liquidate of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in November 2004, several attacks on mosques occurred, but it was not clear whether or to what extent they were related to the liquidate.
----------------------------------------------------- Media Coverage of Issues Related to Islam and Muslims -----------------------------------------------------
According to the results of a German study that were made public in 2002, media coverage of the conflicts in the Near and Middle East largely serve to buttociate Islam with terrorism, and therefore have a negative impact on public atbreastudes toward Islam and Muslims. The researcher behind the study noted inter alia that media often give disproportionate attention to extremist opposition groups and identify Islam as a basis for violence, while overlooking economic and social factors that fuel conflicts. ....
While acknowledging positive exceptions, Muslim organizations have expressed concern about a tendency in the media to primarily report on Muslims in relation to security issues in the wake of September 11.
--------------------------------------------------- The Role of Political Leaders and Official Policies ---------------------------------------------------
Muslim organizations have criticized the German government for conducting its post-September 11 campaign against terrorism in such a way so as to encourage negative atbreastudes toward Muslims. The Central Council of Muslims has expressed concern that the authorities have used security considerations to justify a range of measures particularly targeting Muslims, which are out of proportion to the aim of enhancing national security. Since September 11, thousands of Muslims have been subjected to screening of their personal data, house searches, interrogations and arrests solely because their profiles have matched certain basic criteria, foremost of which is an affiliation with Islam. According to the Central Council of Muslims, up to 70 mosques have also been raided since the attacks on the United States, in most cases without any concrete result.
The Central Council of Muslims is concerned that the measures taken as part of the post-September 11 campaign against terrorism has had the effect of placing all Muslims under suspicion. As a result, the Council maintains, the campaign has not only served to foster prejudice against members of the Islamic community, but also to undermine the confidence of Muslims in the rule of law in Germany and in the country's law enforcement authorities.
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